The case for geography
Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel argued that the Eurasian centres of domestication had an advantage in wild plants and animals, and that a continent's east–west orientation spread crops and techniques along the same latitude and climate, while the Americas and Africa's north–south axes did not.
The result, in his account, was earlier food surpluses, denser populations, specialised crafts, writing, states and — eventually — the guns and ships that conquered the rest. Geography sets the initial conditions, and history does the rest, with human differences playing little role.
There is solid comparative evidence for parts of this: the number of domesticable large mammals really is small and unevenly distributed, and the Columbian exchange really did run mostly one way in pathogens.
The institutional counter-case
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson argued that geography works mainly through institutions, and tested it using settler mortality: where Europeans could settle, they built inclusive institutions; where they died of malaria and yellow fever, they built extractive ones designed to move resources out. Those institutions persisted and predict income today.
That argument has the advantage of explaining variation that geography cannot: North and South Korea share a peninsula, a climate and a people, and differ by an order of magnitude in income. The same is true of East and West Germany, and of Nogales on either side of the US–Mexico border.
The settler-mortality instrument has itself been criticised — the historical mortality estimates are rough, and the exclusion restriction is arguable. But the broad finding, that institutions carry much of the effect attributed to geography, has held up in replication.
Geography matters. Disease environment, transport costs, agricultural potential and the resource base are real constraints, and they help explain why some regions industrialised first.
Geography is not destiny. The countries that were richest in 1500 are not the richest now; the reversal is one of the strongest findings in the field, and it is hard to explain without institutions.
Careful with the popular version. 'Some continents are simply better' slides easily from an argument about crop packages into an argument about peoples, which the evidence does not support and which Diamond explicitly disclaims.
The archive labels this live debate because both mechanisms operate and their relative weight is unresolved.
Why it is in the archive
Because it is one of the few academic arguments that became a mass-market idea, and the popular version is cruder than either side's actual position.
Related: the resource curse — the same institutions-versus-endowment argument in a narrower case.
Sources for this page
- Wikipedia, “Guns, Germs, and Steel” — the argument and its criticsen.wikipedia.org
- Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2001), AER — the colonial origins of comparative developmentdoi.org
- Acemoglu & Robinson (2012), Why Nations Fail — the institutional caseen.wikipedia.org
- Wikipedia, “Environmental determinism” — the older and discredited versionen.wikipedia.org