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The Great Stagnation

The postwar generation got antibiotics, electrification, cars and mass higher education. Since 1970 the measurable productivity dividend has been much thinner — or the measurement has stopped counting what matters.

A semiconductor clean room. The industry that produced the twentieth century's most reliab
A semiconductor clean room. The industry that produced the twentieth century's most reliable productivity gains is also where research productivity has fallen most measurably. Image: Aileen Devlin/Jefferson Lab from Newport News, USA · Public domain — Wikimedia Commons.

The observation

Total factor productivity growth in the United States ran at roughly 2 per cent a year from 1920 to 1970 and has averaged under 1 per cent since, with a brief revival in the late 1990s. Real median wages decoupled from productivity around 1973, a break that has never been reversed.

Tyler Cowen's 2011 book gave the pattern a name and an explanation: the twentieth century picked the low-hanging fruit — free land, cheap energy, big educational gains — and the tree is now bare. Robert Gordon's The Rise and Fall of American Growth makes the stronger historical case that 1870–1970 was a unique century of general-purpose transformation and that nothing since compares.

The measurement counter-argument

The other camp argues that GDP and productivity statistics are bad at capturing free digital goods, quality improvements and the shift to services. A smartphone replaces a camera, a map, a Walkman and a phone call, and appears in the statistics as a smaller share of spending than its usefulness.

Against that: the productivity puzzle is not just about consumer surplus. Business investment, output per hour and wage growth are measured with reasonably well-understood methods, and the slowdown appears across countries with different statistical systems. If the gains were merely unmeasured, the wage data would not have decoupled the way they did.

A sharper version of the pessimism is measurable: Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen and Webb found that research productivity has fallen — it takes many more researchers to produce a constant rate of improvement in semiconductors, agriculture and medicine. Ideas really are getting harder to find.

Where the argument actually stands

Documented: the slowdown is real in the statistics, it is broad across rich countries, and research productivity has declined in the fields where it can be measured.

Contested: whether the slowdown is a technology problem, an institutions problem (rents, market concentration, planning restrictions) or a measurement artefact.

Politically loaded: 'stagnation' is used to argue for deregulation, for public research spending, and for redistribution, depending on the speaker. The diagnosis does not pick the prescription.

The archive labels this live debate: the numbers are not in dispute, and the interpretation is genuinely open.

Why it is in the archive

Because it is a rare economic argument where both sides accept the data and disagree about what data can show.

Related: the end of Moore’s law, and secular stagnation — the demand-side cousin of this argument, still on the frontier list.

Sources for this page

  • Wikipedia, “The Great Stagnation” — the argument and its criticsen.wikipedia.org
  • Gordon (2016), The Rise and Fall of American Growth — Princeton University Presspress.princeton.edu
  • Bloom, Jones, Van Reenen & Webb (2020), AER — are ideas getting harder to find?doi.org
  • Wikipedia, “Productivity paradox” — the measurement debateen.wikipedia.org